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A.

The district court erred when it affirmed the magistrate's holding that
Officer Frasier [hereinafter Frasier]

did

not seize Mr.

Harbison

[hereinafter Harbison] within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho
Constitution because Harbison, a reasonable person, believed that he was
not free to disregard Frasier and leave after Frasier: 1) made a 180 degree
u-turn and pursued the Subaru that Harbison was driving; 2) parked his
police car directly behind the Subaru in the Subaru's entrance route, which
was Harbison's only known exit route on the night of the incident; and 3)
before exiting the police car, Frasier activated emergency lights that
Harbison saw.
1. Frasier's use of emergency lights constituted a technical de facto detention

that caused Harbison to believe that he was not free to leave.
2. The magistrate court erred, not by making a finding of fact, by applying an
irrelevant finding of fact regarding Harbison's possibilities for exit as
opposed to applying facts regarding actions that Frasier took to block
Harbison's exit route, which the Idaho Supreme Court held was the correct
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factor to apply in State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482,488,211 P.3d 91, 97
(2009).

3. Frasier's subjective reason for activating his emergency lights is irrelevant
when considering whether or not a seizure occurred.
4. State v. Schmitt, 144 Idaho 768, 171 P.3d 259 (Ct. App. 2007) is a contrast
to the case at bar. Schmitt serves as an example of how reasonable and
articulable suspicion to justify a seizure may develop when a police officer
exercises patience while determining whether or not objective facts exist
that could give rise to reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.
5. Frasier testified that he had reasonable and articulable suspicion to seize
Harbison at the time that Frasier turned the police car around to pursue
Harbison, thereby admitting that Harbison was not free to disregard him
and leave.

The district court erred when it affirmed the magistrate's application of

B.

State v. Pick, 124 Idaho 601,861 P.2d 1266 (Ct. App. 1993), because Pick
is distinguished from the case at bar both factually and in its legal analysis.
1.

Pick's facts are distinguished from the facts of the case at bar.

2.

Cases in which blue and red emergency lights are activated before a police
officer approaches the subject of his investigation are better applied to the
case at bar than Pick.

VII.

CONCLUSION .............................................................................20
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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case concerns a magistrate court's denial of a Motion to Suppress Evidence where

Harbison, the driver of a Subaru, knew that a police officer made a 180 degree U-tum and
pursued the Subaru that he was travelling in, parked immediately behind the Subaru while no
other cars were in the parking lot, and saw the police car's red and blue flashing emergency
lights before the officer approached the driver. The magistrate denied the motion to suppress,
holding that the encounter was voluntary and not a seizure. Finding that no seizure took place,
the magistrate did not rule on whether or not Frasier had reasonable and articulable suspicion to
justify seizing Harbison. The district court affirmed. Harbison appeals to the Idaho Supreme
Court.
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 3, 2013, at approximately 12:16 AM, Harbison, drove a white Subaru eastbound

on Franklin Road in Meridian, Ada County, Idaho. Supplemental Affidavit of Erik B. Harbison
in Support of Motion to Suppress [hereinafter Supplemental Affidavit] at Paragraph 4. Harbison
turned left into a driveway at 1912 East Franklin Road, then made an immediate right-hand turn
and drove approximately two to three car lengths east, into a parking lot at 1994 East Franklin
Road, where he stopped the car to drop off his passenger. See Supplemental Affidavit at
Paragraphs 5 and 8. Harbison's passenger resided on the other side of Franklin Road but her
driveway was blocked, which is why Harbison parked across the road from her residence. Id. at
Paragraph 8.
As Harbison parked the Subaru, Frasier, a Meridian police officer that was driving behind
Harbison in a police car, believed that the Subaru's activity of pulling into the parking lot was
"suspicious." Memorandum Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress [hereinafter
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Defendant's MTS Brief] at Page 3, Paragraph 1 (citing Exhibit D to said Motion). Immediately
after Frasier passed by the area where the Subaru had parked, he made a 180-degree U-tum to
pursue the Subaru. Supplemental Affidavit at Paragraph 7. The pursuing Frasier drove the
police car to a location directly behind the Subaru, where he parked the police car and activated
its rear emergency lights. Id. at Paragraph 6. Harbison saw the emergency lights reflecting off
of the windows in the commercial building located at 1912 East Franklin Road.

Id. at

Paragraphs 6 and 7. Harbison, who was not familiar enough with the parking lot at the time of
the incident to know of any exit routes other than the one that he had used to enter the lot,
believed not only that his exit route was blocked, but he also knew that Frasier had to make a
180-degree U-tum to pursue him. Id. at Paragraphs 7, 9, and 10. Because of Frasier's pursuit,
parking location, and activated emergency lights, Harbison did not feel free to leave when he
saw the police car stopped directly behind him. Id. at Paragraphs 6, 7, 10, and 11.
At the time that Harbison parked the Subaru, there was neither evidence that Harbison
committed any driving infractions nor was there evidence that Frasier heard any dispatch reports
of any unlawful activity in the area that Harbison parked the Subaru. Memorandum Decision
Regarding Motion to Suppress Evidence, entered December 10, 2013, at Page 4, Paragraph 4
[hereinafter Magistrate's Decision]. Therefore, the only objective fact that Frasier observed
before pursuing and parking immediately behind the Subaru with at least one set of the police
car's red and blue emergency lights activated was that the Subaru parked in a parking lot across
the street from a residential house with its driveway blocked.
Frasier, with his police car's emergency lights activated and reflecting in a way that
Harbison could see, approached the Subaru that Harbison and his passenger, Madyson Sower
[hereinafter Sower], were in. Supplemental Affidavit at Paragraphs 4, 6, 7, 10, and 11. Frasier
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then began investigating what he considered to be suspicious parking activity. See Defendant's
MTS Brief at Page 4, Paragraph 2 (citing Exhibit C to said Brief).
Both Harbison and Sower saw the activated emergency lights before Frasier exited the
police car. Defendant's MTS Brief at Page 3, Paragraph 1 (citing Exhibit D to said Motion).
Sower, at approximately 5:39 - 5:46 into Audio Recording two on Exhibit C, in response to the
police officer's question whether she saw "a cop coming," stated: "I saw you guys pass by and
then when I saw the lights on the car, yeah, I did." At approximately 12:39

12:46 into Audio

Recording two on Exhibit C, Frasier asked Harbison as follows: "Did you see me turn around?
Did you know that a police officer was coming?" Harbison, then responded: "Absolutely, I did
see your lights, absolutely." Frasier then asked Harbison "Did you see me tum around on the
road though after you pulled in here?" Exhibit C, Audio Recording two, at 12:46 - 12:55.
Subsequently, Harbison was arrested and charged with Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol
(second offense) and for Driving Without Privileges. See generally this case's record.
III.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Harbison identifies the following two primary issues on appeal:
A. Whether the district court erred when it affirmed the magistrate's denial of Harbison's
motion to suppress evidence, holding that Frasier did not seize Harbison within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution after Frasier made a 180 degree U-turn to pursue
the Subaru that Harbison was in, parked his police car immediately behind the Subaru
in a location that was Harbison's only known exit route, and before exiting the police
car, the officer activated the police car's rear-facing blue and red flashing emergency
lights - lights that Harbison saw in his rearview mirror before Frasier made contact
with him.
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B. Whether the district court erred when it affirmed the magistrate's application of State

v. Pick, 124 Idaho 601, 861 P.2d 1266 (Ct. App. 1993), in which a rear amber light

was activated, as opposed to applying cases with both red and blue emergency lights
activated.
IV.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court erred when it affirmed the magistrate's denial of Harbison's Motion to

Suppress Evidence because the totality of the circumstances - Frasier's 180 degree u-tum,
Frasier's pursuit of the Subaru with no other motor vehicles on the road; Frasier's actions to park
his police car directly behind the Subaru, the only car parked in the lot, in a location where the
Subaru entered the parking lot; and Frasier's activation of emergency lights before he
approached the Subaru, lights that Harbison saw - show that Harbison reasonably believed that
he was not free to disregard Frasier and leave. Frasier's subjective intent when he activated his
emergency lights is irrelevant. The location of emergency lights on the police car, because
Harbison saw them, is irrelevant when determining whether or not Harbison was seized. Such an
interpretation is contrary to State v. Mireles, 133 Idaho 690, 692, 991 P.2d 878, 880 (Ct. App.
1999), State v. Baker, 141 Idaho 163, 107 P.3d 1214 (2004), and State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho
482, 211 P.3d 91 (2009); and it would lead to extraordinary impractical results and troublesome
public policy if applied as a standard of law.
V.

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW

A.

Appellate Review Standards
"In reviewing a decision on a motion to suppress evidence," an appellate court will

"defer to the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence but freely
review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found." State v. Maddox, 13 7
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Idaho 821,824, 54 P.3d 464,467 (2002) (citing State v. Holler, 136 Idaho 287,291, 32 P.3d 679,
683 (Ct App. 2001); and (State v. Evans, 134 Idaho 560,563, 6 P.3d 416,419 (Ct. App. 2000).
B.

Constitutional Standards
Both the United States and Idaho Constitutions guarantee "the right of the people to be

secure in their persons ... against umeasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. Amend. IV;
Idaho Const. Art. I § 17.

A seizure occurs when a police officer, through some show of

authority, restrains the liberty of a person. State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 649, 51 P.3d 461,
463 (Ct. App. 2002); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 104 S.Ct
1758, 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984).

Furthermore, when a seizure occurs without a warrant, it is

unlawful unless it is based upon reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity is
afoot. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 491, 211 P.3d 91, 100 (2009). When a person is
unlawfully seized, all fruits of the seizure must be suppressed. Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). Therefore, when a defendant is seized without
reasonable suspicion, the evidence against him must be suppressed.
A seizure occurs whenever a person's liberty is restrained by a show of police authority.
Willoughby at 486, 211 P.3d at 95. Whether a person's liberty is restrained is determined by an

objective test -

if, considering the totality of the circumstances, police conduct would

communicate to a reasonable person that he is not allowed to ignore the police and go about his
business, then his liberty has been restrained and he has been seized. State v. Henage, 143 Idaho
655,658, 152 P.3d 16, 19 (2007). Although the conclusion of whether a person has been seized
is determined by examining the totality of the circumstances, there are facts that strongly suggest
that a person has been seized. For example, when a police officer activates his emergency lights,
it is a significant factor when considering the totality of the circumstances. Willoughby at 487,
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211 P.3d at 96. Another factor indicative of a seizure is an officer's action to block a vehicle's
exit route. Id. (Emphasis added).
C.

On-Point Traffic Stop Case Law
In Willoughby, the court held that the defendant was seized when the police pulled behind

the defendant's car, and parked with its overhead lights activated. Id. at 490, 211 P.3d at 99. In
doing so, the court noted that "few, if any, reasonable citizens, while parked, would simply drive
away and assume that the police, in turning on the emergency flashers, would be communicating
something other than for them to remain." Id. at 487, 211 P.3d at 96. Therefore, when a police
officer activates his emergency lights and blocks a car in, the officer has seized it and its
occupants.
A traffic stop that constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment must be supported
by reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws or
that either the vehicle or the occupant is subject to detention in connection with a violation of
other laws. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621, 101 S. Ct. 690
(1981); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979).

The

reasonableness of the suspicion must be evaluated upon the totality of the circumstances at the
time of the stop. Mason v. State Dept. of Law Enforcement, 103 Idaho 748, 653 P.2d 803 (Ct.
App. 1982). This reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause, but more than
speculation or instinct on the part of an officer. State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 661, 664, 809 P.2d
522,525 (Ct. App. 1991).
D.

Reasonable and Articulable Suspicion Standards
When a person is seized without a warrant, the burden is on the state to show that the

seizure was reasonable. In the context of a Terry stop, the state must show that there was
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reasonable and articulable suspicion to support the seizure. Willoughby at 490, 211 P .3d at 99.
Reasonable suspicion exists when there is "some objective manifestation that the person stopped
is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity." State v. Hankey, 134 Idaho 844, 847, 11 P.3d
40, 43 (2000) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 499 U.S. 400, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411
(1981 ).
VI. ARGUMENT
A.

The district court erred when it affirmed the magistrate's holding that Frasier did not

seize Harbison within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution because Harbison, a reasonable person,
believed that he was not free to disregard Frasier and leave after Frasier: 1) made a 180 degree
u-tum and pursued the Subaru that Harbison was driving; 2) parked his police car directly behind
the Subaru in the Subaru's entrance route, which was Harbison's only known exit route on the
night of the incident; and 3) before exiting the police car, Frasier activated emergency lights that
Harbison saw.
1. Frasier's use of emergency lights constituted a technical de facto detention that caused

Harbison to believe that he was not free to disregard Frasier and leave.

It is undisputed that Frasier activated a set of blue and red flashing emergency lights on
the patrol car before he made his initial approach to speak with Harbison. Magistrate's Decision
at Page 3, Paragraph 3. It is undisputed that those emergency lights faced the rear of the patrol
car. Id. It is undisputed that a commercial building with large reflective windows was located
approximately 25 to 30 yards directly behind the patrol car. Id. at 5. It is also undisputed that
Harbison saw the blue and red flashing emergency lights reflecting in the dark of night before
Frasier approached the Subaru. Id. The dispute is regarding whether or not blue and red flashing
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emergency lights, when observed by Harbison after Frasier pursued him and parked immediately
behind the Subaru, sent the message to Harbison that he was not free to disregard Frasier and
leave.
Idaho Code § 49-1404 states: "Any driver of a motor vehicle who willfully flees or
attempts to elude a pursuing police vehicle when given a visual or audible signal to bring the
vehicle to a stop, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. The signal given by a peace officer may be
by emergency lights or siren. The signal given by a peace officer by emergency lights or siren
need not conform to the standards for decibel ratings or light visibility specified in
section 49-623(3), Idaho Code. It is sufficient proof that a reasonable person knew or should

have known that the visual or audible signal given by a peace officer was intended to bring
the pursued vehicle to a stop." (Emphasis Added)

While Idaho Code § 49-1404 technically applies when a police vehicle is in pursuit of a
moving vehicle, the emergency lights' effect on a person in a parked vehicle is the same - the
occupants of either will not feel free to leave. As the Tennessee Supreme Court reasoned in
State v. Moats, 403 S.W.3d 170 (2013), "We see little difference, from the perspective of the

occupants in the vehicle, in turning on the blue lights behind a moving vehicle and turning on the
blue lights behind a parked vehicle. The lights still convey the message that the occupants are
not free to leave." Id. at 183 (quoting State. V Gonzalez, 52 S.W.3d 90 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000)
(holding that a police officer's use of blue lights behind a stopped vehicle was a show of
authority that effected a seizure on the occupants of the subject vehicle); see also State v.
Williams, 185 S.W.3d 311, 316 (Tenn. 2006) (holding that, despite a police officer's subjective

intent when activating his blue lights, the lights made a show of authority constituting a seizure
because a reasonable person in the position of the defendant's would not have felt free to leave).
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In State v. Mireles, 133 Idaho 690, 991 P.2d 878 (Ct. App. 1999), a police officer was
alerted about several calls of suspicious activity regarding a Ford Bronco. Id. at 691, 991 P.2d at
879. The office followed the Bronco for a quarter of a mile. Id. "The Bronco abruptly pulled
over to the shoulder of the road, stopping with half of the vehicle still in the traffic lane." Id.
The police officer pulled his patrol car to the side of the road and activated his emergency lights
to find out if the motorist needed assistance. Id. The police officer "approached to see whether
the driver was alright," and when the police officer looked inside the Bronco he saw several open
and full beer bottles scattered throughout the passenger compartment. Id. The state argued that
the police officer's activation of "the emergency lights was necessary to protect the officer from
other drivers on the road," while Mireles argued that that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion
to stop his vehicle and that the officer should have activated his hazard lights instead of his
emergency lights ifhe was not making a seizure. Id.
The Idaho Court of Appeals held that the district court "erroneously concluded that
Mireles was not detained when [the police officer] activated his emergency lights." Id. at 694,
991 P.2d at 882. In its reasoning, the court concluded that "once [the police officer] activated the
police car's emergency lights, Mireles, assuming he was cognizant of the fact, was not free to
drive away." Id. at 692, 991 P.2d at 880 (Emphasis added). The Mireles Court analyzed the
case pursuant to the reasonable-person test based upon the totality of the circumstances, for
which it cited Waldie and also referenced Idaho Code§ 49-1404. Id. Further, the Mireles Court
distinguished the Mireles case from being analogous to State v. Pick, 124 Idaho 601, 861 P.2D
1266 (Ct. App. 1993), which the district court used as authority to reason that no seizure
occurred, because the facts in Pick dealt with an amber-colored light only as opposed to
overhead emergency lights that were not amber-colored only. Mireles at 692, 991 P.2d at 880.
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Applying the preceding facts to the reasoning in Mireles and the Tennessee cases, any
reasonable person would not have felt free to disregard Frasier and leave. Harbison knew that
Frasier turned his police car in the opposite direction from what it had been travelling to pursue
him. Harbison saw the police car's activated red and blue flashing emergency lights.

To the

best of Harbison's knowledge and belief at the time, he was prevented from turning his own car
around and exiting. Frasier provided a show of authority via the car's emergency lights in a
sufficient way to communicate to Harbison that he needed to remain stopped. Had Harbison
disregarded Frasier's show of authority, surely Frasier would have continued his pursuit of
Harbison, a pursuit that began before Frasier's police car came to a rest immediately behind the
Subaru. Therefore, Frasier seized Harbison within the meaning of the RPTest.
2. The district court erred by affirming the magistrate's application of a finding of fact
regarding Harbison's possibilities for exit as opposed to applying Frasier's actions to block
Harbison's exit route, which the Idaho Supreme Court held was the correct factor to apply in the

Willoughby Decision. Id. at 488,211 P.3d at 97.
The Magistrate's Decision referenced exhibits from this case that show that the lot that
Harbison was seized in had additional exit routes. Based upon those exhibits, the magistrate
found that Harbison "could have driven forward through the parking lot without running into the
patrol vehicle because [the police officer's] vehicle was parked behind the Subaru and was not
blocking several exits from the vacant lot." Magistrate's Decision at Page 10, Paragraph 3. The
magistrate did not find that Harbison knew of the additional exit routes to the parking lot at the
time of the incident. See generally Magistrate's Decision. Neither did the magistrate find that
the police officer did not take any action to block Harbison's exit path.
Magistrate's Decision.
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See generally

Harbison does not challenge the magistrate's finding of fact.

Instead, Harbison

respectfully challenges whether or not that fact is relevant to determine whether or not a seizure
occurred as opposed to analyzing Frasier's actions to block his exit path. Harbison agrees that
the exhibits submitted in this case show that Harbison "could have driven forward through the
parking lot" and exited the lot via another route than the one that Harbison took to drive into the
lot. That fact does not mean that Harbison knew of said exits during the dark of night while in
the lot on the night of the incident at issue in this case. There was not any evidence offered that
suggested that Harbison had ever been in said lot before or that he had knowledge of where the
lot led to. See generally this case's record. Instead, Harbison and the state both submitted
exhibits, at the MTS hearing Harbison should not be held to a standard of knowledge that he did
not possess on the night of his arrest merely because he and the state were able to access maps
after the incident showing that the lot that he was in had additional exits.
Further, while Harbison's state of mind at the time immediately before Frasier's initial
on-foot approach towards Harbison is relevant to determine whether or not a seizure occurred
based upon the totality of the circumstances, Harbison's state of mind was not relevant in regards
to Frasier's actions to block Harbison's exit route. Previously cited in this brief is the holding
from Willoughby that a factor indicative of a seizure is an officer's action to block a vehicle's
exit route. Id. at 487, 211 P.3d at 96 (Emphasis added). The words that the Willoughby Court
used are distinguished from how the magistrate applied his finding of fact that Harbison could
have driven forward because the legal rule at issue involves Frasier's actions, not Harbison's
possibilities, known or unknown.
Frasier parked his car in a place immediately behind Harbison's path of entry. Frasier
could have parked his car in a different location than immediately behind the Subaru in a place
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that the Subaru used to enter the lot. See generally Map Exhibits admitted during the Motion to
Suppress Hearing, held November 1, 2013. The same exhibits that show that Harbison could
have driven forward also show that Frasier could have parked next to the Subaru. Frasier would
have been able to speak to Harbison via a rolled down window had he chose to park in that
location; but Frasier did not do so. Frasier could have parked his car to the side of Harbison's
entry path instead of parking directly in it; but Frasier did not do so. The map exhibits show that
Frasier could have parked in a number of locations; but he chose one

a location directly behind

the Subaru in the path that the Subaru used to reach its parked position. Frasier chose to take
action to park directly behind the Subaru in the Subaru's entry path. Frasier's action of parking
behind the Subaru instead of elsewhere shows that Frasier purposefully chose that specific
location to park his police car as opposed to any others. Therefore, the applicable factor of
Frasier's actions show that he placed his police car in a location that would prevent a driver who
was not familiar with the lot from exiting the lot. Such action is the correct fact to apply to the
totality of the circumstances test, not whether Harbison, in hindsight, could have driven forward
or not.
Based upon the preceding facts and reasoning, any reasonable person would not have felt
free to disregard Frasier and leave when knowing that Frasier turned his police car in the
opposite direction from what it had been travelling to pursue him, saw activated red and blue
flashing emergency lights that obviously had the police car as their source, and to the best of
knowledge and belief, was prevented from turning his car around and exiting, disregarding
Frasier altogether.
The second prong of the test to determine whether or not a seizure took place is to
analyze whether Harbison submitted to the Frasier's authority. This is unchallengeable for the
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state given the facts that occurred after the initial pursuit and show of authority that Harbison
was not free to leave. Harbison remained in the Subaru and followed Frasier's command when
he was told to exit. Further, while Harbison refused to participate in field sobriety tests, he
agreed to be arrested and took the breathalyzer test. See generally Defendant's MTS Brief
Exhibits C, D, and E. The state never alleged that Harbison did not submit to Frasier's authority,
so that issue cannot be challenged on appeal. Therefore, both elements

that Harbison was not

free to go and that he submitted to Frasier's authority - clearly exist to show that Frasier seized
Harbison.
3. Frasier's state of mind is irrelevant when considering whether or not a seizure occurred.
The magistrate, by stating three times in his decision that Frasier activated his emergency
lights because he was concerned about "officer safety" (Magistrate's Decision at Page 3,
Paragraph 3, and Page 5, Paragraphs 3 and 4), showed that he relied to at least some degree on
Frasier's intent when analyzing whether or not Frasier seized Harbison. Pursuant to Mireles,
however, the subjective intent of a police officer when activating his emergency lights is
irrelevant. As was previously analyzed in this brief, the Mireles Court concluded that: "Once
[the police officer] activated the police car's emergency lights, Mireles, assuming he was
cognizant of the fact, was not free to drive away. See I.C. § 49-1404(1) (prohibiting attempting
to elude a police officer when signaled to stop by the officer's emergency lights and/or siren).
Thus, the district court erroneously concluded that Mireles had not been detained."
The Mireles Court's conclusion regarding the specific issue of a police officer's
subjective intent when activating his emergency lights is on point.

As cited above, the

magistrate in Harbison's case relied on Frasier's intent when reasoning that Harbison was not
seized before Frasier approached the car that Harbison was driving even through Harbison had
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already seen the police car's emergency lights. The record shows, without dispute, that Harbison
was cognizant of the fact that he was not only pursued by a police car that parked immediately
behind his only known exit point, but also that the police car's emergency lights were flashing
reds and blues. Harbison's state of mind as a reasonable person is relevant, not Frasier's state of
mind. Therefore, the reasoning and holding from Mireles show that Frasier seized Harbison
upon Harbison's recognition that the police car's emergency lights were flashing, if not before.
4.

State v. Schmitt, 144 Idaho 768, 171 P.3d 259 (Ct. App. 2007) is a contrast to the case at

bar. Schmitt serves as an example of how reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify a
seizure may develop when a police officer exercises patience while determining whether or not
objective facts exist that could give rise to reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.
Police officer patience is a significant difference between this case and the Schmitt case.
In Schmitt, a police officer saw activity within a warehouse that usually did not have workers
active at night; and he also saw a car parked outside the warehouse near some businesses that
had experienced several recent burglaries. Id. at 769, 171 P.3d at 260. Instead of rushing and
making one or more seizures, the police officer called for backup and waited with another officer
who arrived at the scene. Id. The two officers waited for nearly an hour. Id. Eventually, three
people came out of the warehouse, one of them being Mr. Schmitt, who had an open container of
beer in his hand. Id.

Ultimately, Mr. Schmitt was convicted pursuant to a conditional guilty

plea; and although a motion to suppress was filed in the case, it was denied because the police
officers were patient and waited until they observed actual criminal activity before they detained
the individuals involved. Id. at 772, 171 P.3d at 263.
Frasier did not exercise patience as the police in Schmitt did. Instead, Frasier, after he
saw a Subaru drive into a parking lot and stop, made an immediate U-Turn and pursued the
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Subaru. Because there are numerous legitimate reasons to be in a parking lot shortly after 12:00
a.m. and the facts here are far less suspicious than those that the Supreme Court held to be
inadequate to support a seizure in Willoughby, the seizure made upon Harbison was illegal.
Frasier not only lacked reasonable and articulable facts to support that the Subaru or its
occupants were engaged in criminal activity, but he lacked reasonable and articulable facts to
suggest that any criminal activity was afoot in the area where he seized Harbison whatsoever.
Even if Frasier would have had reasonable suspicion that some criminal activity was
about to be afoot, it was not related to Harbison and the Subaru that he was in. Harbison drove
into a parking lot across the street from residential homes to drop off his passenger. Nothing in
that fact pattern would cause a reasonable person to believe that the Subaru's occupants were
engaged in any criminal activity whatsoever.

Therefore, the example of using appropriate

patience to determine whether or not criminal activity is afoot, as the police officers did in
Schmitt and not in Willoughby or in this case, is a significant distinction that, when applied to

this case, shows that Harbison was unjustifiably seized.
5. Frasier testified that he had reasonable and articulable suspicion to seize Harbison at the time
that Frasier turned the police car around to pursue Harbison, thereby admitting that Harbison was
not free to disregard him and leave.
Defendant's Brief in Rebuttal to State's Objection to Defendant's Motion to Suppress
[hereinafter MTS Rebuttal Brief], Pages 3 and 4, Paragraph 13 of the "Relevant Facts" section,
cites the following testimony given by Frasier at 43:00 - 43:18 from the Motion to Suppress
Hearing's transcript: "at the moment that he 'decided to turn around and pursue the Subaru into
the parking lot,' that he 'had reasonable and articulable suspicion to investigate what may be a
crime that could be occurring regarding Planned Parenthood." Frasier had already testified that
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when he turned the police car around, the only activity that he observed regarding the Subaru
was that it "drove into a parking lot and stopped." Id. at Page 3 (Relevant Facts Section),
Paragraphs 5 and 6. In swnmary, Frasier believed that he had the necessary reasonable and
articulable suspicion to seize Harbison because Frasier saw a Subaru drive into a parking lot and
stop - nothing more.
The fact that Frasier was in pursuit of the Subaru Mr. Harbison was in is evidenced by the
Frasier's own words, specifically in his questions to both Harbison and Sower. At approximately
12:39 - 12:46 into Audio Recording two on Exhibit C, Frasier asked Harbison as follows: "Did
you see me turn around? Did you know that a police officer was coming?" Those two questions
are incredibly important when analyzing whether Frasier seized the Subaru and its occupants. In
those two questions, Officer Frasier admitted that he not only pursued the Subaru that Harbison
was in, but also that he completely turned his vehicle around from the direction that it was
previously travelling to pursue Harbison - and he did so in such a way that he believed that
Harbison may have seen him make the tum and give pursuit. Frasier's next question is even
more telling of his intent: "Did you see me turn around on the road though after you pulled in
here?" Exhibit C, Audio Recording two, at 12:46 - 12:55. In that question, Frasier indicated
that the reason he made a U-tum and pursued the Subaru was because it "pulled in" there. The
context of the Frasier's questions reveals that Frasier pursued the Subaru because he believed
that the Subaru driving into the parking lot was suspicious, so he chose to pursue the Subaru,
seize it, and conduct an investigation of the "suspicious" parking activity.
As previously cited and analyzed in this brief, Frasier had less reasonable and articulable
facts to justify a detention than the police in Willoughby did. Considering Frasier's testimony,
that he believed that he had the necessary reasonable suspicion to seize Harbison upon the
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Subaru stopping in a parking lot, in light of the fact that it supports Harbison' s belief that he was
not free to go, leaves no doubt under a simple deductive reasoning analysis that the only logical
conclusion to the ultimate outcome of this issue is that Harbison was not free to go before Frasier
approached him. Frasier believed that Harbison was not free to go. Harbison believed that he
was not free to go. Harbison was not free to go.
Sower believed that she and Harbison were not free to go also. Sower's belief that they
had been pursued and seized is evidenced by the fact that she did not attempt to walk across the
street to go home; but instead, she remained in the passenger seat until the police officer made
contact with her and until he told her that she was free to go at approximately 5:58 - 6:01 into
Audio Recording two, Exhibit C. Had Sower been free to go, Frasier would not have needed to
tell her that she was free to go. Additionally, Frasier, if he was making a consensual stop, would
not have inquired whether the Subaru's occupants saw a police car coming after them, nor would
he have turned on any emergency lights whatsoever, because turning on the emergency lights
served not only as a signal that the police officer had seized someone, but under Idaho law it
required the occupants to remain in place until directed otherwise by a police officer.
Harbison was mandated by Idaho Code§ 49-625(1) to "remain in that position until the .
. . police vehicle" had "passed, except when otherwise directed by a peace officer." The police
car did not pass Harbison because the Subaru that Harbison was in was the object of Frasier's
pursuit. That pursuit included a 180-degree U-turn by the police car and activation of emergency
lights .. Even if Frasier activated only his rear emergency lights and only after he parked directly
behind the Subaru, nothing in Idaho Code § 49-625(1) states that the driver of a vehicle that is
stopped with a police vehicle behind it may drive away depending upon which emergency lights
are activated and for what reason. A driver parked in front of a police vehicle with any of its

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF -17

emergency lights activated cannot read the mind of the police officer inside. The driver is
obligated to remain in that position "except when otherwise directed by a peace officer." The
period at the end of that sentence demands emphasis because the statute does not provide for an
"unless, except," or an "if," - it is a command without exceptions. Therefore, Harbison was
mandated by Idaho Law to remain in his position unless or until Frasier directed him to do
otherwise - and Frasier did not do so.

Instead, he approached the Subaru and began

investigating the "suspicious" parking activity that led him to make a U-tum, pursue the Subaru,
and activate his emergency lights. Those facts, when applied to Idaho Law, show that Frasier
had complete legal authority over the Subaru and its occupants, Harbison included.
For the State's position - that Frasier did not effect a seizure even though it alleges that
Frasier had reasonable and articulable suspicion to seize the Subaru and its occupants - to have
merit, this Court must believe that Frasier truly believed that criminal activity was afoot, so he
seized a vehicle that he thought was engaged in such activity, as he testified. But after seizing
the Subaru, Frasier would have allowed the occupants to disregard him and leave if Harbison
decided to do so. Such an analysis defies simple logic. Frasier's belief that he had reasonable
and articulable suspicion to seize Harbison, belief that Frasier acted upon, does not hold up under
current case law, as cited in Willoughby or under a common sense standard. Therefore, Frasier's
testimony supports the conclusion that he made a mistake in believing that he had reasonable
suspicion to seize Harbison when he did not, he acted on that belief by seizing Harbison, and
Harbison was never free to go possibly as early as when Frasier made his U-Turn, and definitely
before Frasier approached the Subaru on foot.
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B.

The district court erred when it affirmed the magistrate's application of State v. Pick, 124

Idaho 601, 861 P.2d 1266 (Ct. App. 1993), because Pick is distinguished from the case at bar
both factually and in its legal analysis.
1.

Pick 's facts are distinguished from the facts in the case at bar.

The Pick holding contains several important and distinguishing facts between that case
and this case. One is that the defendant in Pick had pulled off to the side of the road, where
safety concerns may have justified the police officer using some means to alert oncoming traffic
that vehicles were but a few feet away from the traffic lanes; and therefore, the vehicles were a
potential hazard to approaching drivers. Pick at 602, 861 P.2d at 1267. Harbison did not pull off
to the side of the road; but instead, he ensured that the Subaru was clear of the roadway by
pulling into a parking lot.

Supplemental Affidavit at Paragraph 5. The police officer that

approached Ms. Pick began asking if she had car problems, Pick at 604, 861 P.2d at 1269; but
Frasier approached Harbison and immediately began investigating what he considered to be
suspicious parking activity. Defendant's MTS Brief at Page 4, Paragraph 2 (citing Exhibit C to
said Brief).
Another distinction between the two cases is that Pick does not provide any indication
that the defendant saw the amber lights before the police officer approached her truck. See
generally Pick. Harbison, however, saw the police car's flashing emergency lights, both blue

and red, reflecting off of the windows in the commercial building directly behind the location
where the police car and the Subaru were located. Supplemental Affidavit at Paragraph 6.
As stated in Appellant's MTS Rebuttal Brief on Page 9, Paragraph 1 (citing to an audio
transcript of the MTS Hearing), Frasier's "testimony supported [Harbison's] affidavit because
[Frasier] admitted that the commercial building at 1912 East Franklin Road faced east, contained
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windows facing east (ARTl at 25:46 - 25:55), and that both the police car and the Subaru were
facing east so the rears of both vehicles, including the activated emergency lights, were directed
at the front of the commercial building and its windows (ARTl at 30:10 - 30:22)." Frasier also
"testified that he recalled the Subaru's occupants, in response to his question whether or not they
saw him coming, respond by stating that they saw his lights. ARTl at 39:10 - 39:26." Id. There
is no factual dispute regarding whether or not Harbison saw the police car's emergency lights, so
that fact distinguishes this case from Pick, in which the question of whether or not the defendant
saw the rear red emergency light was not evident by reading the decision alone. See generally
Pick.

2.

Cases in which blue and red emergency lights are activated before a police officer

approaches the subject of his investigation are better applied to the case at bar than Pick.
Another distinguishing factor between Pick and the case at bar is that the Pick police
officer's rear-deck lights were colored amber only (Id. at 602), but Frasier's lights were blue and
red. As a result, the Mireles Court's reasoning regarding emergency lights is more on point than
Pick. The Mireles Court focused on the difference in the light colors when it distinguished
Pick's facts from Mireles 's facts. Mireles at 692, 991 P.2d at 880. Except for the community

caretaking issue in Mireles, the facts in Harbison's case are more consistent with Mireles than
Pick. Any reasonable person, Harbison included, would not feel free to disregard a police officer

and leave upon seeing flashing blue and red lights coming from a police car parked immediately
behind him.
VIL

CONCLUSION

With the change in the Idaho Code§ 49-1404, surely the police officer in this case would have
re-engaged in pursuing Appellant had he attempted to drive away. Appellant's MTS Rebuttal
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Brief at Page 3, Paragraph 13, cites to the record of the police officer's testimony that "at the
moment that he 'decided to turn around and pursue the Subaru into the parking lot,"' the officer
"believed that he 'had reasonable and articulable suspicion to investigate what may be a crime
that could be occurring regarding Planned Parenthood.' ARTl at 43:00 - 43:18."

Such

statements make it irrefutably clear that if Harbison would have driven forward and attempted to
disregard Frasier, Frasier would have pursued him for fleeing and eluding pursuant to Idaho
Code§ 49-1404.
Here, the reasonable-person standard under said statute applies to Harbison based upon
the facts herein. Because the facts are such that Frasier himself testified that Harbison was not
free to leave, unless the state alleges that Frasier is not a reasonable person, his testimony serves
as further evidence that Harbison, as the object of Frasier's pursuit, should not have felt feel free
to leave. The test must be applied consistently; and Frasier's testimony supports Harbison's
reasonable belief that he was not free to disregard the police officer and leave.
The display of rear-facing red and blue flashing lights, given the context of reflective
windows providing visual notice to Harbison, provided him with the reasonable-person notice
within the context of Idaho Code § 49-1404. A reasonable person, upon seeing red and blue
flashing lights coming from a police car parked immediately behind him, especially when not on
the roadway and knowing that his vehicle was the target of the police officer's pursuit, would not
feel free to disregard the police officer and leave.

Such was the reasonable belief held by

Harbison when he saw the police car's red and blue flashing lights behind him. Even if an
extremely strict reading of the unamended statute could lead one to conclude that Harbison's
belief was mistaken, his belief was definitely reasonable under the circumstances.
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Harbison has analyzed, compared, and contrasted existing Idaho case law and relevant
statutes that apply to the facts of this case, as well as persuasive authority from other
jurisdictions. Harbison, based upon his reasonable belief under the totality of the circumstances,
believed that he was seized before Frasier approached the Subaru that he was driving. Harbison
respectfully asks this Court to grant his appeal by revising the district courts decision affirming
the magistrate's decision that he was not seized at the time the police officer approached him.
O'CONNOR LAW, PLLC

By:
William J. O'Connor, Esq.,
Attorney for Appellant
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